PASCAL - Pattern Analysis, Statistical Modelling and Computational Learning

Different orientations of males and females in computer-mediated negotiations
Ron Katz, Yair Amichai-Hamburger, Efrat Manisterski and Sarit Kraus
Computers in Human Behavior Volume Volume 24, Number Issue 2, 516 -534, 2008. ISSN 0747-5632


This paper examines the existence of gender differences in computer mediated (CM) negotiations where “gender differences” refers to the differential patterns of behavior of males and females proposed by Rubin and Brown (Rubin, J. Z., & Brown, B. R. (1975). Bargainers as individuals. In The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation (pp. 157–196). New York: Academic Press). Namely, males are more profit oriented and females are more relationship oriented. External manipulations encouraging cooperativeness with other negotiators either by profitable or social incentives were inserted in the negotiations performed within the Colored Trails (CT) game framework. The negotiators included 27 females and 33 males who negotiated in foursomes via computers. In the first study we focused on independent negotiators whose success was not crucially dependent on the other party. In the second study negotiators were dependent upon one another, encouraging integrative solutions. The findings reveal that the social incentive (team factor) positively affected the females’ cooperativeness in contrast to males who were slightly less cooperative. On the other hand, profitable incentive influenced the males’ cooperativeness level, while no change was shown by females, which is consistent with Rubin and Brown’s distinction. These tendencies were reduced when playing with a non-reciprocal simulated agent. The causes for gender differences in CM as well as in face-to-face (FTF) negotiations are discussed.

EPrint Type:Article
Project Keyword:Project Keyword UNSPECIFIED
Subjects:User Modelling for Computer Human Interaction
ID Code:3838
Deposited By:Ron Katz
Deposited On:25 February 2008