The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures
Srgiu Hart and Yishay Mansour
In: STOC 2007, June 8-16, 2007, San Diego, CA.
We study the question of how long it takes players to reach
a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player
initially knows only his own payo® function. We derive
lower bounds on the communication complexity of reaching a
Nash equilibrium, i.e., on the number of bits that need to be
transmitted, and thus also on the required number of steps.
Speci¯cally, we show lower bounds that are exponential in
the number of players in each one of the following cases: (1)
reaching a pure Nash equilibrium; (2) reaching a pure Nash
equilibrium in a Bayesian setting; and (3) reaching a mixed
Nash equilibrium. We then show that, in contrast, the com-
munication complexity of reaching a correlated equilibrium
is polynomial in the number of players.
|EPrint Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Project Keyword:||Project Keyword UNSPECIFIED|
|Subjects:||Theory & Algorithms|
|Deposited By:||Yishay Mansour|
|Deposited On:||20 May 2007|