

# Can Chimeric Persons Be Used in Multimodal Biometric Authentication Experiments?

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**Abstract.** Combining multiple information sources, typically from several data streams is a very promising approach, both in experiments and to some extents in various real-life applications. A system that uses *more than one* behavioral and physiological characteristics to verify whether a person is who he/she claims to be is called a *multimodal* biometric authentication system. Due to lack of large true multimodal biometric datasets, the biometric trait of a user from a database is often combined with another different biometric trait of yet another user, thus creating a so-called a *chimeric user*. In the literature, this practice is justified based on the fact that the underlying biometric traits to be combined are assumed to be independent of each other given the user. To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature that approves or disapproves such practice. We study this topic from two aspects: 1) by clarifying the mentioned independence assumption and 2) by constructing a pool of chimeric users from a pool of *true* modality matched users (or simply “true users”) taken from a bimodal database, such that the performance variability due to chimeric user can be compared with that due to true users. The experimental results suggest that for a large proportion of the experiments, such practice is indeed questionable.

## 1 Introduction

Biometric authentication (BA) is a problem of verifying an identity claim using a person’s behavioral and physiological characteristics. BA is becoming an important alternative to traditional authentication methods such as keys (“something one has”, i.e., by possession) or PIN numbers (“something one knows”, i.e., by knowledge) because it essentially verifies “who one is”, i.e., by biometric information. Therefore, it is not susceptible to misplacement or forgetfulness. Examples of biometric modalities are fingerprints, faces, voice, hand-geometry and retina scans [1].

Due to inherent properties in each biometric and external manufacturing constraints in the sensing technologies, no single biometric trait can achieve 100% authentication performance. This problem can be alleviated by combining two or more biometric traits, also known as the field of multimodal biometric authentication. In the literature, there are several approaches towards studying fusion of modalities. One practice is to construct a large database containing several biometric traits for each user. This, however, can be very time-consuming and expensive. Another practice is to combine biometric modalities of a database with biometric modalities of another biometric database. Since both databases do not necessarily contain the *same* users, such combination results in *chimeric users*. From the experiment point of view, these biometric modalities belong to the same person. While this practice is commonly used in the multimodal literature, e.g., [2, 3] among others, it was questioned whether this was a right thing to do or not

during the 2003 Workshop on Multimodal User Authentication [4]. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work in the literature that approves or disapproves such assumption.

There are at least two arguments that justify the use of chimeric users, i.e., i) *modality independence assumption* – that two or more biometric traits of a single person are independent of each other; and ii) *privacy issue* – participants in the multimodal biometric experiments are not ready to let institutes keep record of too much of their personal information (raw biometric data) at the same place. If such information is misused, it could be dangerous, e.g., identity theft. It is for this same reason that processed biometric features are preferred for storage rather than raw biometric data. Note that the first argument is *technical* while the second one is *ethical*. Although both arguments are equally important, the second one is beyond an experimenter’s control and is related to the policy related to a database. For instance the policy should address who can use the database and how it should be used. When a database is carefully designed to protect the participants’ privacy right, this issue should be resolved. For this reason, this paper focuses on the first argument.

We set out to investigate the validity of the modality independence assumption by using two approaches, namely : 1) by pinning down the concept of *independence* and 2) by simulating the effect of chimeric users experimentally and measuring the discrepancy in terms of performance between the use of chimeric users and the use of true users. Note that these two approaches represent *two different ways* of thinking about the problem: one theoretical and the other experimental. To verify this hypothesis, we limit our scope to studying such effect to bimodal as generalization to more than two modalities is direct. It should be emphasized that the use of chimeric users is not limited to biometric authentication, but may be in general applicable to problems involving multimodal streams. Hence, this study is of interest to researchers studying multimodal fusion.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 underpins the concept of independence between biometric traits (the first approach of studying the validity of chimeric users); Section 3 describes the database to be used; Section 4 details the experimental procedure and presents the results (the second approach); and finally this is followed by conclusions in Section 5.

## 2 On the Independence Assumption

### 2.1 Preliminary

Suppose that each authorized person is identified by a unique identity claim  $j \in \mathcal{J} \equiv \{1, \dots, J\}$  and there are  $J$  identities. We sometimes call these users as clients to oppose a set of other unauthorized persons known as impostors. Hence, a biometric authentication system is aimed at distinguishing clients from impostors, which is an *aggregated* two-class problem, i.e., a two-class problem with  $J$  distinctive users. In this problem, it is common to represent a user by his/her feature template or *model*, i.e., a set of parameters derived from the features. Suppose that the output due to comparing a user model  $C_j$  to a feature  $X$  is  $y(j)$ . For each client or user model  $C_j$ , there is a corresponding impostor model  $I_j$ . Lacking a proper definition<sup>1</sup>, the impostor model is often *naively* defined as the model of other finite users  $\forall_{j'} | j' \in \mathcal{J} - j$ . We the purpose of clarity, we will drop the client index  $j$  such that writing  $C$  is equivalent to writing  $C_j$  and writing  $y$  is equivalent to writing  $y(j)$ . To decide whether to accept or reject the access request represented by feature  $X$  claiming identity  $j$ , previous theoretical studies such as [5, 6] often use the following decision function:

$$\text{decision}(P(C|X)) = \begin{cases} \text{accept} & \text{if } P(C|X) > 0.5 \\ \text{reject} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

<sup>1</sup> Ideally, this impostor model should be the world population minus the user  $j$ . In terms of computation and data collection effort, this is not feasible and in practice not necessary.

where by the probability law,  $P(C|X) + P(I|X) = 1$ . Although this decision rule is correct, such formulation does not allow the interpretation of a threshold-based decision function such as:

$$\text{decision}(y) = \begin{cases} \text{accept} & \text{if } y > \Delta \\ \text{reject} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

where  $\Delta$  is the user-independent decision threshold. It can be easily seen that  $y = P(C|X)$  and  $\Delta = 0.5$  when comparing both decision functions. The decision function in Eqn. (2) is found in most biometric authentication systems. For instance, if the matching score  $y$  is based on a distance between a user template  $X_{tmplt}$  and the submitted feature  $X$ , i.e.,  $y \equiv \text{dist}(X_{tmplt}, X)$ , where  $\text{dist}$  is a distance measure, the decision function in Eqn. (1) cannot reflect such measure since it applies to probability outcome only. To allow the interpretation of threshold in the case of a distance measure, we propose that the classification be carried out such that:

$$\text{decision}(\text{LPR}) = \begin{cases} \text{accept} & \text{if LPR} > 0 \\ \text{reject} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

where LPR is *logarithmic posterior ratio*. It is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LPR} &\equiv \log \left( \frac{P(C|X)}{P(I|X)} \right) = \log \left( \frac{P(X|C)P(C)}{P(X|I)P(I)} \right) \\ &= \underbrace{\log \frac{P(X|C)}{P(X|I)}}_{\text{LLR}} + \underbrace{\log \frac{P(C)}{P(I)}}_{\Delta} \equiv \text{LLR} - \Delta, \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where we introduced the two terms:  $y \equiv \text{LLR}$  or Log-Likelihood Ratio and a threshold  $\Delta$ . The first term corresponds to the *interpretation of* score  $y$  as an LLR. The second term is a constant. It handles the case of different priors (hence fixed *a priori*), i.e., it reflects the different *costs* of false acceptance and false rejection. Note that  $y$  is a direct function of  $X$  and the model variable associated to it (say  $\theta$ ), i.e.,  $y = f_\theta(X)$ . We use the function  $f$  with parameter  $\theta$  to explicitly represent the *functional relationship* between the variables  $y$  and  $X$ .

Although  $y$  is interpreted as an LLR here, many different machine-learning algorithms (e.g., Gaussian Mixture Models, Multi-Layer Perceptrons, Support Vector Machines) can be viewed as an approximation to this relationship, without necessarily giving it a probabilistic interpretation, i.e.,  $y$  being a probability. Suppose that  $y$  is an instance of the variable  $Y$  and is drawn from the distribution  $\mathcal{Y}$ . The decision function in Eqn. (2) then implies that  $E_{\mathcal{Y}|C}[Y] > E_{\mathcal{Y}|I}[Y]$ , where  $E_{\mathcal{Z}}[Z]$  is the expectation of  $Z$  under the law  $\mathcal{Z}$ . In words, this means that the expected client score has to be greater than that of impostor. To allow interpretation of a distance measure, one can simply interchange between  $C$  and  $I$ , such that  $E_{\mathcal{Y}|C}[Y] < E_{\mathcal{Y}|I}[Y]$ .

Depending on the outcome of the decision (as a function of the threshold  $\Delta$ ), a biometric authentication system can commit two types of errors, namely, False Acceptance (FA) and False Rejection (FR). The error rates of FA and FR are defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FAR}(\Delta) &= 1 - P(Y|I \leq \Delta) \\ \text{FRR}(\Delta) &= P(Y|C \leq \Delta), \end{aligned}$$

where  $P(Y|k \leq \Delta)$  is the cumulative density function of conditional variable  $Y$  within the range  $[-\infty, \Delta]$  for each class  $k$ . Note that a unique point with  $\Delta^*$  where  $\text{FAR}(\Delta^*) = \text{FRR}(\Delta^*)$  is called Equal Error Rate (EER). EER is often used to characterize a system's performance. Another useful performance evaluation point for *any given threshold*  $\Delta$  (not necessarily  $\Delta^*$ ) is called Half Total Error Rate (HTER) and is defined as the average of FAR and FRR, i.e.,:

$$\text{HTER}(\Delta) = \frac{1}{2}(\text{FAR}(\Delta) + \text{FRR}(\Delta)).$$

The discussion until here concerns only a particular client. In reality, one has extremely few examples of genuine accesses  $y|C$  and relatively large impostor accesses  $y|I$ , as mentioned earlier. As a result, the estimation of user-specific threshold is extremely unreliable. For this reason, the user-independent versions of FAR, FRR and EER, as well as the threshold are often used. Although there exists abundant literature to estimate user-specific threshold (see for instance a survey in [7, 8]), common threshold is by far a standard practice.

## 2.2 Different levels of Dependency Assumption

There are a number of different assumptions that can be made about the levels of dependency when one considers combining multimodal information sources. These dependencies have implications for the mathematical modeling and classifier used. Two notions of dependencies can be distinguished here, i.e. *feature-oriented* dependency and *score-oriented* dependency. The former assumes dependency at the feature-level while *not considering* the dependency at the score level. The latter, on the other hand, assumes *independence at the feature level* but handles dependency uniquely at the score level. These two dichotomies thus give rise to four types of dependencies in *decreasing order*:

- **Strict Feature Dependence.** It is characterized uniquely by the feature-oriented dependence assumption.
- **Loose Feature Dependence** It is characterized by feature-oriented independence but score-oriented dependence
- **Loose Feature Independence** It is characterized by both feature-oriented and score-oriented independence.
- **Strict Feature Independence.** It is characterized uniquely by the feature-oriented independence assumption.

Suppose that  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are features of two different biometric modalities. Using the same Bayesian formulation (with focus on LLR) as in the previous Section, the four categories can be formally stated as follows:

- **Strict Feature Dependence:**

$$y_{SD}(j) = \log \frac{p(X_1, X_2|C_j)}{p(X_1, X_2|I_j)} \quad (5)$$

$$\equiv f_{\theta_j}(X_1, X_2), \quad (6)$$

where the function  $f$  explicitly represents any classifier with the associated parameter  $\theta_j$ . By so doing, we actually provide a Bayesian interpretation of the classifier  $f$ . One possible weakness of this approach is known as the “curse of dimensionality”, whereby modeling the joint features in higher dimension can cause a degraded performance compared to methods resulting from the other assumptions (to be discussed below).

- **Strict Feature Independence:**

$$y_{SI}(j) = \log \frac{p(X_1|C_j)p(X_2|C_j)}{p(X_1|I_j)p(X_2|I_j)} \quad (7)$$

$$= \log \frac{p(X_1|C_j)}{p(X_1|I_j)} + \log \frac{p(X_2|C_j)}{p(X_2|I_j)} \quad (8)$$

$$= y_1(j) + y_2(j) \quad (9)$$

$$\equiv f_{\theta_j^1}(X_1) + f_{\theta_j^2}(X_2) \quad (10)$$

where  $y_i(j) \equiv \log \frac{p(X_i|C_j)}{p(X_i|I_j)}$  and  $\theta_j^i$  is the model parameter associated to modality  $i$  and user  $j$ . Note that in theory the two classifiers involved,  $f_{\theta_j^i}|i = \{1, 2\}$ , do not have to be homogeneous (the same type). In practice, however, some form of normalization may be needed if they are not homogeneous, e.g., from different vendors or based on different algorithms. It can be seen that using this Bayesian framework, the independence assumption leads to the well-known sum rule. On the other hand, using the probabilistic framework  $y(j) \equiv p(C_j|X)$ , this dependency would have led to the well-known product rule (proof not shown here).

– **Loose Feature Dependence:**

$$y_{LD}(j) = \log \frac{p(y_1(j), y_2(j)|C_j)}{p(y_1(j), y_2(j)|I_j)} \quad (11)$$

$$\equiv f_{\theta_j^{COM}}(y_1(j), y_2(j)) \quad (12)$$

$$= f_{\theta_j^{COM}}(f_{\theta_j^1}(X_1), f_{\theta_j^2}(X_2)), \quad (13)$$

where  $f_{\theta_j^{COM}}$  can be considered as a second-level classifier, also called a fusion classifier. The loose feature dependence is a result of committing to the feature independence assumption – which means that the scores  $y_1(j)$  and  $y_2(j)$  can be derived separately – and score-oriented dependence assumption – implying that the dependency at the score level should be modeled. This formulation actually motivates the use of trainable classifiers in fusion. Suppose that  $\mathbf{y}(j) = [y_1(j), y_2(j)]^T$  is a vector and an instance of the variable  $\mathbf{Y}(j)$ . If  $\mathbf{Y}(j)$  is drawn from a class-conditional Gaussian distributions and that both the client and impostor distributions share a common covariance matrix  $\Sigma$ , it is possible to show that:

$$f_{\theta_j^{COM}} = w_1(j)y_1(j) + w_2(j)y_2(j), \quad (14)$$

where  $\mathbf{w}(j) = [w_1(j), w_2(j)]^T$  has the following solution:

$$\mathbf{w}(j) \propto \Sigma^{-1} (E[\mathbf{Y}(j)|C_j] - E[\mathbf{Y}(j)|I_j]) . \quad (15)$$

The linear opinion pool (or weighted sum) shown here is a typical solution given by Fisher's linear discriminant [9, Sec. 3.6]. Other solutions using the same linear discriminant function (but possibly *more powerful* since they do not make the class-conditional Gaussian assumption) includes Support Vector Machines with a linear kernel [10] and the perceptron algorithm [9, Chap. 6], the latter of which generalizes to the least square and the logistic discrimination/regression solutions (depending on the error criterion). It can thus be seen that the loose feature dependence assumption motivates the use of a fusion classifier. It should be noted that the Bayesian framework using Eqn. (11) as a departure point does not dictate that a linear classifier has to be used. In practice, however, to the best of our knowledge, non-linear classifiers have not been reported to provide *significantly* better results over their linear counterparts in this application. Often, due to small training sample size on a *per user basis*, the classifier at this level is trained across all users. Although user-specific fusion classifiers have been proposed, e.g., [3], global fusion classifier is by far the most commonly used approach. We will study this case here. Hence, as long as fusion is concerned, the index  $j$  in the term  $f_{\theta_j^{COM}}$  of Eqn. (12) can be dropped, so as for the weights in Eqn. (14).

– **Loose Feature Independence:**

$$y_{LI}(j) = \log \frac{p(y_1(j)|C_j)p(y_2(j)|C_j)}{p(y_1(j)|I_j)p(y_2(j)|I_j)} \quad (16)$$

$$= \log \frac{p(y_1(j)|C_j)}{p(y_1(j)|I_j)} + \log \frac{p(y_2(j)|C_j)}{p(y_2(j)|I_j)} \quad (17)$$

$$\equiv f_{\theta_j^1}(y_1(j)) + f_{\theta_j^2}(y_2(j)) \quad (18)$$

$$= f_{\theta_j^1}(f'_{\theta_j^1}(X_1)) + f_{\theta_j^2}(f'_{\theta_j^2}(X_2)), \quad (19)$$

where  $f'_{\theta_j^i}$  is a classifier taking features  $X_i$  and  $f_{\theta_j^i}$  is another classifier taking the score  $y_i(j)$ , for all  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ . Since  $f_{\theta_j^i}$  is a one-input one-output function, this procedure is also called *score normalization* [11]. Among the score normalization techniques, user-specific Z-score normalization is perhaps the most representative one. Z-norm and other techniques are surveyed in [7]. It turns out that the fusion classifier is a sum rule. Again, due to lack of user-specific data, the score normalization is treated the same across users. Hence, we can replace  $f_{\theta_j^i}$  by  $f_{\theta^i}$  (without the subscript  $j$ ) in Eqns. (18) and (19), for all  $i = \{1, 2\}$ .

The above four types of architecture as a result of different levels of dependence assumption are certainly not exhaustive. It is possible to combine say strict feature dependence and strict feature independence assumption such that the resultant architecture compensates for both assumption (see for instance [12]).

As can be seen, depending on the level of dependency between  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  that one is willing to commit to, one arrives at any of the four choices of architectures. In multimodal biometrics, where two (or more) biometric modalities are captured using different sensors, it is well accepted that the strict feature dependence assumption (the first one) is *in general* not true [2]. Hence, as long as the use of chimeric users is concerned, only the last three levels of dependency are relevant. In the experimental setting with chimeric users, one simply uses the concatenated score with modalities of *other users*, i.e.,

$$\mathbf{y}_{chimeric} = [y_1(j), y_2(j')]^T \text{ where } j \neq j'.$$

and combines the concatenated score by using classifiers such as Eqns. (9), (12) and (18), respectively for the last three levels of dependency.

Thus we arrive at the crucial question: “*Do the different levels of dependency allow to switch the identities?*”. If one follows strictly (and agrees with) the Bayesian framework presented so far, none of these assumptions provide any hint about the use of chimeric users in practice. They merely guide how one should model the final score  $y$  just before making the accept/reject decision. Lacking any plausible justification and theoretical explanation, we resolve to an experiment-driven approach to study the effects of switching identities. Before presenting the experimental approach, we first present the database used in the next section.

### 3 The XM2VTS Database

There exists several bimodal biometric authentication databases for this purpose, e.g., M2VTS, XM2VTS and BANCA databases. We will use the XM2VTS for two reasons: it has among the largest number of users, i.e., 200 clients and 95 casual impostors; and the results of many single modal experiments (in scores) are available for fusion. These scores are also publicly available<sup>2</sup> and are reported in [13].

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.idiap.ch/~norman/fusion>

**Table 1.** The Lausanne Protocols as well as the fusion protocol of XM2VTS database.

Data sets	Lausanne Protocols		Fusion Protocols
	LP1	LP2	
LP Train client accesses	3	4	NIL
LP Eval client accesses	600 (3 × 200)	400 (2 × 200)	Fusion dev
LP Eval impostor accesses	40,000 (25 × 8 × 200)		Fusion dev
LP Test client accesses	400 (2 × 200)		Fusion eva
LP Test impostor accesses	112,000 <sup>†</sup> (70 × 8 × 200)		Fusion eva

†: Due to one corrupted speech file of one of the 70 impostors in this set, this file was deleted, resulting in 200 less of impostor scores, or a total of 111,800 impostor scores.

The XM2VTS database [14] contains synchronised video and speech data from 295 subjects, recorded during four sessions taken at one month intervals. On each session, two recordings were made, each consisting of a speech shot and a head shot. The speech shot consisted of frontal face and speech recordings of each subject during the recital of a sentence. The database is divided into three sets: a training set, an evaluation set and a test set. The training set (LP Train) was used to build client models, while the evaluation set (LP Eval) was used to compute the decision thresholds (as well as other hyper-parameters) used by classifiers. Finally, the test set (LP Test) was used to estimate the performance.

The 295 subjects were divided into a set of 200 clients, 25 evaluation impostors and 70 test impostors. There exists two configurations or two different partitioning approaches of the training and evaluation sets. They are called Lausanne Protocol I and II, denoted as **LP1** and **LP2** in this paper. In both configurations, the test set remains the same. Their difference is that there are three training shots per client for LP1 and four training shots per client for LP2. Table 1 is the summary of the data. More details can be found in [15]. The first column shows the data set, divided into training, evaluation and test sets. Columns two and three show the the partition of the data according to LP1 and LP2 whereas column four shows the partition of data for the fusion protocols that are *consistent* with the Lausanne Protocols. As far as fusion is concerned, there are only two data sets, labeled as “Fusion dev” (for development) and “Fusion eva” (for evaluation), since the data used in LP training sets are reserved to construct the base systems<sup>3</sup>. Note that the fusion development set is used to calculate the parameters of fusion classifier as well as the optimal global threshold. They are then applied to the fusion evaluation set. Since the threshold is *calculated from the development set*, the reported HTER obtained from the evaluation set is thus called an *a priori* HTER.

## 4 An Experimentally Driven Approach

This Section aims at answering the following question: “Is an experiment carried out using chimeric users *equivalent* to the one carried out using true users in terms of a given performance measure?”. Suppose that the performance measure of interest is a *a priori* HTER. The above question can then be rephrased as: “Is the *a priori* HTER obtained using chimeric users *similar to* (or *not significantly* different from) the one obtained using the true users?”. We can formally specify the null hypothesis and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as follows:

<sup>3</sup> Given the naming conventions of the XM2VTS corpus which are admittedly rather confusing, we *consistently* use the term “development set” to mean training set and “evaluation set” to mean test set.

- $H_0$ : The *a priori* HTER obtained from chimeric users is *equivalent* to the one obtained from true users.
- $H_1$ : The *a priori* HTER obtained from chimeric users is *different from* the one obtained from true users.

Suppose that the HTER value due to chimeric users,  $v$ , is an instance of a random variable  $V$  which follows an unknown distribution. We are interested in:

$$p(v \in {}^c[a, b] | H_0) = \alpha, \quad (20)$$

where  ${}^c[a, b]$  is the complementary of  $[a, b]$  – or the *critical region*, i.e., the set of values for which we will reject  $H_0$  – and  $\alpha$  is the level of the test – or the Type I error, i.e., the probability of selecting  $H_1$  when  $H_0$  is true. By convention,  $\alpha$  is usually set to 1% or 5%. Note that the critical region is computed such that the Type I error is only meaningful for a given  $\alpha$  level.


Since the distribution of HTER due to chimeric users is unknown, we need to estimate it using a random permutation procedure such that in each permutation, a biometric modality of one user is paired with another biometric modality of yet another user. This procedure is somewhat similar to the bootstrap-based non-parametric statistical test [16, 17] but different in two aspects: a bootstrap manipulates samples whereas the permutation process here manipulates user identities; and a bootstrap draws samples with replacement whereas the permutation process, as its name implies, permutes identities, which means it draws identity *without replacement*. Since each permutation creates a “new” set of fusion scores, a fusion classifier has to be constructed before the HTER value can be computed. By repeatedly applying the random permutation procedure, we can then obtain a set of HTER values, which represents our non-parametric estimate of the distribution  $\mathcal{V}$ . Evaluating Eqn. (20) is simply a matter of determining if the HTER due to true users is in  $[a, b]$  (hence in favor of  $H_0$ ) or in its complement  ${}^c[a, b]$  (hence in favor of  $H_1$ ). The values  $a$  and  $b$  are chosen such that  $p(v \in [a, b]) = 1 - \alpha$  for a given  $\alpha$  and  $p(v < a) = p(v > b)$ . Under such constraints, it is obvious to see that  $p(v < a) = p(v > b) = \alpha/2$ . To illustrate this idea, we took an experiment from the XM2VTS score-level fusion benchmark database, and applied the hypothesis test procedure mentioned. The results are plotted in Figure 1.

Two fusion classifiers are used in the experiments, namely the mean operator and the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). Both of these fusion classifiers are representative approaches of the *loose feature independence* assumption and the *loose feature dependence* assumption, respectively. For the mean operator, prior to fusion, scores are normalized to zero mean and unit variance such that none of the two expert scores dominate just because of a larger variance. The normalization parameters are calculated from the development set. For the GMM, the number of Gaussian components is tuned by simple validation.

According to the fusion protocol, there are 21 available multimodal data sets. The HTER distribution due to random identity match is sampled 1000 times and there are 200 users. This means that the 1000 samples are a sheer portion of  $1000/200! \approx 10^{-372}$ , i.e., one cannot possibly evaluate all the possible permutations. Table 2 lists the HTER range at 95% of confidence due to 1000 samples of random identity match (chimeric-user effect) and the corresponding HTER of true identity match. The first 15 are fusion datasets taken from LP1 while the rest are from LP2. For the values of HTER of true identity match falling outside the confidence range, a \* sign is marked. There are two \*’s for the mean operator and three for the GMM.

Since Table 2 is limited to the criterion of EER only, we also plot the whole spectrum of the so-called Expected Performance Curve (EPC) [18], which selects a different thresholds for various criteria, on a separate validation set, as follows:

$$\Delta_* = \arg \min_{\Delta} \omega \text{FAR}(\Delta) + (1 - \omega) \text{FRR}(\Delta) \quad (21)$$



**Fig. 1.** The distribution of *a priori* HTER (thin curve) estimated from 1000 random samplings of chimeric users versus the HTER of true users (bold vertical line). All thresholds were calculated to minimize HTER on the development set. The HTER of the true users is in the 87.7 percentile (or 1.42% HTER) and is within the 2.5 (dashed vertical line) percentile (or 0.69% HTER) and 97.5 percentile (dotted vertical line) (or 1.62% HTER). Hence, this experiment supports the null hypothesis.

where  $\omega$  ranges from 0 to 1. Using this threshold, the EPC then plots the corresponding HTER on the test set, with respect to  $\omega$ , i.e.,  $\text{HTER}(\Delta_*, \omega)$ . This enables us to obtain unbiased estimates of the HTER since all hyper-parameters, including the threshold, are selected on some separate validation set.

Figures 2 and 3 thus show EPC curves of the distribution due to random identity match (with a 95% confidence interval) and the EPC curve of true identity match, for the mean operator and the GMM, respectively. As can be observed, there are much more points where the HTER of true identity match falls out of the 95% confidence range. Precisely, exactly 8/21 of experiments for the mean operator and 7/21 of experiments for the GMM. Hence, based on the available fusion datasets, about one third of them shows that the experiments with chimeric users are *inconsistent* with those carried out with the true identity match setting. Considering the fact that the mean operator has no parameters to be estimated and that the GMM has some, the free parameters in the fusion classifier *does*, to some extents, contribute to the variability observed by HTER due to the chimeric-user effect. Note that in both experiments, the 1000 random identity permutations were constrained to be the *same*. This is essential to keep the possible experiment-induced variation to be minimal.


## 5 Conclusions

In this paper, the following issue was addressed: “Can chimeric persons be used in multimodal biometric authentication experiments?”. This topic was tackled by 1) identifying the different levels of dependency assumptions as a result of two dichotomies: feature-oriented dependence and score-oriented dependence; and 2) by experimentally comparing the effects due to using chimeric users with those using the original true modalities of same users (or simply “true users”). One major conclusion from the first approach is that the independence assumption does not imply that one can use the chimeric users in experiments. Instead, such assumption only guides how one should construct a classifier to combine information from different modalities. Neither does the

**Table 2.** The *a priori* HTER range (whose confidence falls between 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles, corresponding to the usual middle 95% confidence bound) of 1000 samples of random identity match (chimeric-user effect) versus the *a priori* HTER of true identity match for both the mean operator and the GMM fusion classifiers, for each of the 21 fusion datasets. For each experiment, the threshold is calculated to fulfill the EER criterion on the training set. For the values of *a priori* HTER of true identity match falling outside the confidence range, a “\*” sign is marked.

No.	LP	Data set (Face) (Speech) experts	HTER (%)			
			Mean		GMM	
			chimeric	true	chimeric	true
1	1	(FH,MLP)(LFCC,GMM)	[0.36, 1.02]	0.79	[0.10, 0.60]	0.35
2	1	(FH,MLP)(PAC,GMM)	[0.70, 1.36]	1.13	[0.38, 1.13]	1.08
3	1	(FH,MLP)(SSC,GMM)	[0.54, 1.24]	0.87	[0.32, 1.03]	0.72
4	1	(DCTs,GMM)(LFCC,GMM)	[0.16, 0.68]	0.53	[0.11, 0.58]	0.44
5	1	(DCTs,GMM)(PAC,GMM)	[0.71, 1.59]	1.44	[0.69, 1.62]	1.42
6	1	(DCTs,GMM)(SSC,GMM)	[0.60, 1.38]	1.14	[0.55, 1.39]	1.21
7	1	(DCTb,GMM)(LFCC,GMM)	[0.13, 0.47]	* 0.55	[0.04, 0.51]	0.47
8	1	(DCTb,GMM)(PAC,GMM)	[0.30, 0.93]	* 1.13	[0.29, 0.97]	* 1.06
9	1	(DCTb,GMM)(SSC,GMM)	[0.27, 0.82]	0.75	[0.22, 0.82]	* 0.86
10	1	(DCTs,MLP)(LFCC,GMM)	[0.52, 1.16]	0.84	[0.09, 0.58]	0.50
11	1	(DCTs,MLP)(PAC,GMM)	[0.95, 1.77]	1.12	[0.54, 1.40]	0.86
12	1	(DCTs,MLP)(SSC,GMM)	[0.84, 1.64]	1.37	[0.45, 1.19]	1.02
13	1	(DCTb,MLP)(LFCC,GMM)	[1.31, 2.62]	1.62	[0.23, 1.08]	0.58
14	1	(DCTb,MLP)(PAC,GMM)	[2.42, 3.84]	3.65	[1.41, 2.91]	2.60
15	1	(DCTb,MLP)(SSC,GMM)	[2.07, 3.43]	2.88	[1.00, 2.22]	1.55
16	2	(FH,MLP)(LFCC,GMM)	[0.34, 0.91]	0.69	[0.01, 0.64]	0.13
17	2	(FH,MLP)(PAC,GMM)	[0.53, 1.21]	1.14	[0.27, 0.98]	0.73
18	2	(FH,MLP)(SSC,GMM)	[0.50, 1.10]	0.98	[0.17, 0.83]	* 0.89
19	2	(DCTb,GMM)(LFCC,GMM)	[0.00, 0.33]	0.13	[0.00, 0.38]	0.38
20	2	(DCTb,GMM)(PAC,GMM)	[0.04, 0.46]	0.18	[0.03, 0.51]	0.16
21	2	(DCTb,GMM)(SSC,GMM)	[0.01, 0.38]	0.18	[0.01, 0.51]	0.17

second more empirical approach support the use of chimeric users. Indeed based on 21 fusion datasets and two fusion classifiers, only about two thirds of the data indicate that chimeric users can be used, or in other words, the use of true users does not vary significantly, at 95% of confidence, compared to the case when chimeric users are used in experiments. The rest of the rather large one-third of datasets suggest that the use of chimeric users cannot appropriately replace the dataset of the true modality matched dataset. Considering the high variability of HTER due to the effect of chimeric users, several runs of fusion experiments with different identity match are *strongly recommended*. Although such remedial procedure does not necessarily reflect the case when true modality matched identity is used, it *at least* gives a more accurate figure about the possible range of HTER values when the true identities are used. If the 21 fusion datasets are representative of this scenario, then, one might have a 2/3 chance of better reflecting the real HTER, after performing a large number of fusion experiments (1000 in our case!). However, one should *probably not* use the obtained HTER as a claim that the performance reflects the actual case where the real multimodal datasets are used. The current experimental approach adopted here is somewhat preliminary and in some ways limited in scope. It does not answer for instance, “how far the score distribution estimated with the independence assumption is from the one esti-




**Fig. 2.** The EPC curve range (due to 1000 samples of random identity match) at 95% of confidence versus the EPC curve of true identity match, for each of the 21 experiments, using the *mean operator* as the fusion classifier. They are labeled accordingly from 1 to 21 corresponding to the experiment numbers in Table 2. A \* sign is marked for the experiments whose one or more HTERs of true identity match fall outside the confidence range. For these points, circles are plotted on the corresponding EPC curve.

mated with the dependence assumption?”. Secondly, it does not yet answer the question: “Are the relative HTER values, in contrast to absolute values as done here (e.g., in comparing two fusion methods) *consistent* between experiments with chimeric users and those with true users?” These issues will be dealt with in the near future.

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**Fig. 3.** As per Figure 2, except that a Gaussian Mixture Model fusion classifier is used in place of the mean operator. There are 7 data sets reporting that the EER due to true identity match is significantly different from the EER distribution due to random identity match at 95% of confidence, contrary to 8 in Figure 2.

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